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Prologue
The predominant characteristic of the mathematician,
as the writer sees him, is that of unrest, for the mathematician is never fully satisfied.
accepts the

challen~e

To illustrate, he

offered by a problem new to him.

Un-

til he sees the solution to the problem in entirety, he is
tense, anxious.

After the problem ha.s been solved, calm

is restored and the thrill of accomplishment supplants the
former tenseness.

Offhand, then, it would appear that the

mathematician at this star:i:e is satisfied and can lean back
in his chair, contented.

Before long, ho'·1ever, he meets

another problem, accepts the

challen~e,

and again feels

tensions which will be resolved only when the problem is
resolved in his own mind.
the present

challen~e

He begins to suspect that after

there will be another, and then an-

other.
What, then, leads the mathematician on?
hope to accomplish?

What does he

Why does awareness of a new problem-

situation invite consideration on his part, rather than
rejection?

What is the mathematician trying to do?

In the first place, a problem by its very nature supgests
an incompleteness, a lack, something missing.

The mathe-

matician, discontented with ·9uzzles not completely fitted
together, finds himself searching for a pattern in order
that he may discover the missing pieces.

Not happy with

isolated statements, he strives to establish relationships
among the statements.

Finally, by inferences dra-1•m from

the relationships discovered, he sees the solution and consequently the entire pattern.

An admiration for "whole-

ness" then, partly explains the drive activating the mathematician.
In addition, the mere realization of the presence of a
challenge invites action from
such a person feels that he
sented to him.

~yone

~

so geared.

That is,

accept the challenge pre-

To ignore the challenge is unthinkable.

Similarly, the story is told tha.t a mountain-climber, asked
to analyze his reasons for scaling a particular mountain,
explained that he had to climb the mountain simply because
the mountain was there.

The presence of the mountain con-

stituted the challenge, finding the best manner in which to
scale the mountain was the problem, and making the actual
climb would prove his acceptance of the challenge.
Besides revealing a yearning for "wholeness" and a
desire to meet headlong any challenging situation, the
mathematician shows a keen responsiveness to beauty.

For

one thing, he finds beauty in a perfectly constructed proof.
True, the ordered symmetry of the proof may not be at all
apparent to one whose eye and mind are not so attuned.
However, lack of awareness of beauty on the part of some
people does not mean the proof holds no attractiveness for
anyone.

Thus, one piece of land may belong to a Mr.

Jackson, the adjoining piece may belong to a Mr. Reeves,
but the landscape belongs to whoever has the eye to behold
it.
The mathematician sees beauty not only in the proof

before him, but also in the reasoning which has produced
the proof.

Clear-cut ideas, precisely and forcefully

expressed, are interesting in themselves, thereby attracting the mathematician's attention and evoking his admiration.
However, the aspect of the mathematician's life that
is probably most often slighted in appraisals is his creativeness.

For instance, in solving a problem or in proving a

theorem he has constructed something, a whole out of what
were disorganized segments.

By examining the segments,

by visualizing a pattern connecting them, and by supplying
missing parts, he has built a structure, an idea resting
on a firm foundation of logical reasoning.

Moreover, the

idea so structured is acceptable, indeed irresistible, to
anyone subscribing to the assumptions on which the reasoning is based.

He may express his creativeness in attacking

a familiar relationship from a new point of view;

he may

pose a challenging problem to his students, his colleagues,
or his family;

or, if he is one of a privileged few, he

may have the happy experience of building up by induction
a theorem heretofore not guessed by anyone.
Whether the mathematician's efforts are examined for
aspects of "wholeness", beauty, or creativeness, one fact
must surely be noted.

In common with the work of scholars

in other fields, his work evidences a search for truth, or
rather, a search for what he conceives to be truth.
In his attempts to discover truth, though, he realizes
that he will never fully succeed.

After all, as that

discerning mathematician, Edson H. Taylor, has remarked,
"The search for truth is an infinite process."

The math-

ematician, teased by a question that will not leave him
alone, applies resources of ingenuity, concentration, and
tar-sightedness to getting the answer.

By the time the one

question has been dealt with to his satisfaction, other
questions have arisen, each just as insistent as the first.
Sometimes, in his search for answers, he has had the
thrill of getting sudden, totally unexpected
the problem at hand.

insi~ht

into

That is, he may have grasped immedi-

ately the very relationship pointing to the solution, when
he had

~

previously worked out the pertinent steps.

Then

too, it is just possible that, when involved in proving a
theorem, he has seen in a "flash", so to speak, what step
he should take next.

Since the mathematician attributes

both of these exciting flashes of understandina: to intuition, he may, in the course of his adventures, find himself wondering about intuition and subsequently huntin,e:
for explanations.

Chapter I
Introduction to Intuition
Down through the ages, in all places and at all times,
man has been seeking truth.

At times truth has stood madden-

ingly close, yet has eluded capture.

At other times, despite

endless efforts with test-tube and beaker, with Geiger
counter and atom-smasher, it has stood aloof, unreachable.
On still other occasions, for brief moments, it has appeared tractable, even attainable.
Thus history has witnessed Abraham following the direction of an invisible

P,Od

into a promised land, Euclid

applying with vigor his powers of organization, and Omar
Khayyam, despite emphasis on the here-and-now, looking for
order in algebra.

Still later arises

~pinoza,

who, in his

seclusion, searches for answers to the insistent question
of what constitutes knowledge.

-

In addition to considering what is true, man has been
teased by the puzzle of explaininp:
lar belief to be true.
to intuition.

.!:!.£!

he knows a particu-

Accordingly, he may ascribe an idea

That is, he may have had the experience of

"knowing", when he had not previously come across evidence
that would "prove" his idea to be true.

Perhaps now is the

time to bring out a point often overlooked, that the lack
of proof does not necessarily indicate that a statement is
false, or even doubtful.

As an extreme example, it is con-

ceivable that a person might be unable to supply any testimony or record of his birth.

Thus he could not prove, in

a legal sense, that he had ever been born.
1.

A few years

2.

ago a Syrian lecturer lampooned the American emphasis on
birth certificates.

Apparently in Syria the mere presence

of the person was considered evidence enough of the fact
of birth.
In addition to intuition there are three other ways of
knowing, which will be examined in a moment.

Let us think

of the ways of knowing as the rungs of a ladder with the
most honored, reliable method at the top.
occupies the topmost rung.

Obviously £roof

At the other extreme, and there

may well be argument' Vie are goinp; to place intuition.

No

attempt will be made to assign authority and experiment to
definite rungs, as the dependability of either of these
hinges upon the care with which it is used.
For instance, upon examining authority as a method
of knowing facts, probably the most serious consideration
lies in what one is willing to call an authority.
are his credentials?

Is he recognized as an authority by

people whose opinion can be respected't
styled" authority?

\'v'hat

Is he a "self-

The fact that his statements have been

published does not make him an authority.

Yet frequently

gullible people are willing to accept the most outlandish
claims, simply because such claims have been published.
Such people will believe everything from the label on a
patent-medicine bottle to an

au~ust

pronouncement that the

world is about to end.
Furthermore, the fact that a person speaks or writes
in a self-assured manner does not make him an authority.
Indeed, much self-assurance results from too little infor-

3.
mation, or from knowledge about only one aspect of a subject.

Even the fact that a man is regarded highly by the
a
scholars of the day asArecognized authority does not mean
that he is in possession of absolute truth.

.ti·or example,

Aristotle was for centuries deemed the source of inf or-

-

mation on anatomy and almost every other subject as well.
According to legend, if a mediaeval teacher were dissecting
a dog for the benefit of his anatomy class, and if one of
the dog's organs did not comply with what was written in
Aristotle's book, the dog was wrongi
Another limitation to using authority as a way to
support arguments is the fact that although a man may have
convinced himself that the authority he is naming really is
such, the person with whom he is debating may not accept
that same source as reliable.

Consider for a moment the

task of trying to convince a Buddhist of vhristian beliefs
by quoting the Bible.

Apparently, for any individual, an

authority is any source that, for various reasons, he acce!)ts
as sound;

consequently, he uses the source both to gain

new information and support opinions that to him seem valid.
As to the matter of experiment, there seem to be at
least four weaknesses or limitations.

Yirst, and this re-

quirement surely could not be over-stressed, is the condition that the experimenter must assure himself that he
is controlline all but one factor.

Otherwise he cannot

know that the result obtained has stemmed from the one condition for which he is testing.

Another difficulty lies

4.
in attempting to duplicate conditions in a series of experiments.

If the experimenter is not extremely cautious

in this respect, he will be unable safely to draw a generalization from his result.

In the third place, there is

the liability of his concluding more than what has actually
been established.

As an illustration, suppose a hybrid

black r,uinea pig were mated to another hybrid black one.
On authority of those who have conducted the experiment,
there is a strong probability that one-fourth of the offspring will be white, the others, black.

Suppose a man

not conversant with the laws of heredity were to look at
the two black parents, look at the offspring, regard especially the black ones, and conclude that all the black
ones were hybrid with respect to color of coat.

Such a

conclusion would appear "reasonable", as the presence of
the white offspring would lead him to think that the black
ones could not be pure-line black.

However, this is a

false conclusion, for actually any one of the black offspring might be pure-line black, a point that would be
settled if the study were carried through to the extent
of crossing a black one with one that was known to be hybrid with respect to color.

The occurrence of no white ones

in the third generation thus produced would indicate definitely that the questionable parent was pure-line.

Thus,

to get back to the original pair considered, the conclusion
drawn by the man was unsound.

In summation, all that he

had actually established was that crossing a particular
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black male guinea pig with a particular black female guinea
pig yielded offspring, some of which were black, others,
white.

That one fact was all that he had ascertained as

a result of that particular experiment.
A fourth limitation in the use of experiment is the
obvious fact that one cannot test all cases.

At first

glance, some may be surprised at the mention of anything
so readily apparent.

However, as one cannot test all cases

having like conditions, one cannot determine the results
for all cases.

Hence one cannot know through experimentation

that a certain set of conditions yields a certain result
for all cases.
Although it is impossible to test all cases, it is
possible, nevertheless, to establish the validity of a
formula by the process of mathematical induction.

This

process, which consists of only two steps, will be reviewed by making reference to the formula involving compound interest.

The formula, A ~ P(l +

rt,

gives the

amount A to which an original principal P would accumulate
in n years if invested at an interest rate r, compounded
annually.

Since the interest is compounded, there is a

new principal at the beginning of each successive year.
It is easy to see that, at the beginninp of the second
year, the new principal will be (P +Pr), which equals
P{l

+

r}.

Thus, at the beginning of the third year, the

new principal will be P(l + r) + P(l + r)r, which, when
simplified, becomes P(l

+

.1

r) •

By a similar argument, the

6.
new principal at the beginning of the fourth year can be
.a

shown to be equal to P ( 1 + r} •

However, the formula has

been tested only in those cases in which n is equal to 1,
2, or 3.

It is unsafe to assume at this juncture that the

solution to this

formula will hold for all integral n.
The

dilemma lies in applying the

process that is termed mathematical induction.

First of

all, the formula is assumed to be valid for some value of
n, for instance, for n equal to s.

The immediate goal is

to show the existence of an inheritance property, namely,
that the validity of the formula for n equal to s implies
the validity of the corresponding formula for the succeeding integral value, s

+

1.

'l'hus, we assume that at the end

of s years, the accumulation is· P{l+ r)5

•

Since, during
$

the next year, the interest earned will be P{l + r) r, at
the end of {s + 1) years, the total amount can be shown to
..S+l

be P{l + r)
perty.

, which establishes the inheritance pro-

Once the all-important inheritance property has

been established, one can assume that, if the formula is
verified for some specific value of n, usually for n equal
to 1, then the formula is likewise true for the case in
which n is equal to the next successive integer.

Of course,

this last statement is tantamount to saying that the formula holds for all n.

Usually, however, the verification

for a specific value is established first;
heritance property is shown to exist.
all cases can be tested,

~ertain

then, the in-

Hence, although not

formulas can be established

by mathematical induction.
In general, the validity of any proposition is recognized most readily, if the proposition has been proved.
Built upon a foundation of certain statements deemed acceptable, a proof proceeds along the lines decreed by logic,
step by step, to an unequivocal conclusion.

Thus, he who

subscribes to the statements on which the proof is constructed is necessarily convinced of the "truth" or the
conclusion.

Characterized by a high degree of reliability

and certainty, therefore, the method of proof deservedly
occupies the position of greatest honor, the topmost rung.
When using this method, one must be sure, if the proof is
to be rigorous, that every step can be supported by something
previously accepted.

That is, each step must be substantiated

by a proof already established, by a definition, or by an
assumption, together with correct application of the rules
pertaining to logical inference.

Moreover, even before

attempting to outline the proof, the student meets a sizeable hurdle.

That is, he has the responsibility of seeing

to it that he does not introduce special conditions.

To put

it differently, he must determine that he does not assume
any conditions other than those specifically stated by the
hypotheses.

This careless intrusion of special conditions

is particularly dangerous at the stage when he starts to
make a drawing.

For instance, if the hypotheses of a the-

orem in tenth-grade geometry mention a parallelogram, the
student, in making an illustration, must not draw a rectangle,

s.
as the rectangle is a special type of parallelogram.
the student were to draw a

rectan~le,

If

he would be assuming

that he was to deal with perpendicular lines and ninetydegree angles.

That is, he would be ,P'.uilty of having in-

truded special conditions, conditions neither explicitly
stated nor even implied in the hypotheses.
In these remarks, it is hoped that a groundwork for
the study of intuition has been laid.

In laying such ground-

work, we have presented intuition as one of four ways of
knowing.

Having dealt with the limitations of three of

the ways, we shall venture next into a discussion of the
mysteries of intuition itself.

c..:hapter II
Characteristics of Intuition
Probably the most formidable deterrent to the study
of intuition is the difficulty of definition.

At the out-

set the impossibility of defining the term with exactness
is asserted;

arguments to support this assertion will now

be outlined.

Later, the characteristics of intuition will

be noted and examined in some detail.
For one thing, the abstractness of the term makes precise definition difficult.

Invisible, inaudible, and most

certainly intangible, intuition does not lend itself to
the type of detci.iled observation possible with concrete
objects.

That is, the student of intuition cannot examine

his subject as he might inspect, for instance, a picture,
a musical composition, or a rose.

Since the properties

are of an elusive quality, they prevent proper classification, a prerequisite to definition.

Of course, abstract-

ness alone does not imply the impossibility of definition,
but surely at best such a condition makes the task of defining an imposing one.
A far stronger argument against definition lies in the

fact that what is intuitively obvious to one may not be, to
another.l

That is, if the application of a concept is

familiar to a man, he is apt to give that concept intuitive

1. Hans Hahn, "Geometry and Intuitionn,
American (April, 1954}, CXC, 84 ff.

Scientific

10.

status.

A fact intuitively clear to a mechanic might be

known to another only as a conclusion derived from the most
involved reasoning.

A relationship £"rasped immediately by

a mathematician mi7ht never be suspected by another.

An

observation ascribed to intuition by a botanist mi.1'.!'ht well
be questioned by the uninitiated.
Since there is room for vast

disa~reement

as to just

what ideas may be knov.m by intuition, it follows that intuition itself cannot be categorized or pigeon-holed in
an unimpeachable manner.

Hence the term intuition defies

definition.
Although the term remains undefined, or perhaps because of the very lack of precise definition, it is imperative that intuition at least be described.

Accord-

ingly, as intimated in the first paragraph, several characteristics will be viewed.
In the first place, intuition is not diametrically
opposed to reason.

l''or example, the personnel manager of

an industrial firm finds himself confronted with eleven
applications for a particular job.

He will conduct a

short interview with each applicant with the object of
eliminating eight of the hopefuls.

At almost the first

glance, and after the slightest exchange of words, he will
have judged which eight 1:vill be unsuited to the work.

Intu-

ition has at least helped in forming the first judgments.
That is, the man "feels" that a pri.rticular three will be
well-suited to answering the demands of the job.

At the

11.
next stage, the most careful reasoning must be employed.
The personnel manager must sort through several different
kinds of evidence, such as the ratings of former employers,
judgments pertainine to the applicant's character, and considered opinions as to personality traits, such as promptness, dependability, initiative, and cooperativeness.

All

evidence he must weigh carefully in the hopes of choosing
the best of the remaining three.

Thus intuition plus care-

ful reasoning guide his selection.
As another instance, a student has been assigned a
theorem to Prove.

He observes not only all facts given in

the hypothesis, but also the relationship he is to prove.
By reasoning, he determines the validity of each step, but
which step to take next is often indicated by intuition.
Again, logical reasoning has worked alongside intuition to
produce results.
Although ·intuition and logical reasoning may operate
simultaneously in the solution of a problem, intuition can
be described as a way of getting ideas without words, a
short cut to knowledge.

Understandably then, a person chal-

lenged to support a view known intuitively will be at a
loss for words to explain

h2!'

he knows.

Furthermore, intuition is possibly almost the only way
of reasoning employed by those people who have given no

12.

study to the subject of reaching conclusions.l

'!'hose who

have never given thought to deduction as a way of drawing
inferences continually make "snap judgments", not necessarily false;

seemingly, such persons do not fall back

on logic to defend their views.
The reference just made to the fact that "snap judgments" are not always incorrect suggests a point that can
hardly be stressed too much, namely, that intuitive reasoning is not necessarily weak or faulty.

.1.1·or instance,

there is the trite case of the wife who warns her husband
against having business dealings with a man she has just
met.

When pressed for reasons, she asserts only that she

knows the would-be business associate cannot be trusted.
Of course, the concluding portion of such a tale always
depicts the wife's predictions fulfilled and the husband's
undying gratitude for having been warned in time.
In addition, intuition is usuaily a satisfactory guide
in reaching conclusions to the extent that things seem to
be as they are.

Thus the student, upon inspecting a pair

of intersecting lines for the first time, intuitively conthe

eludes thatAvertical angles are equal.
appear to be equal;

The vertical angles

they are equal.

1. The phrase "intuitive reasoning" may be paradoxical
to some; that is, some observers may with vehemence claim
that if a fact be intuitively known, then that fact cannot
have stemmed from reasoning. If the term reasoning gives
difficulty, perhaps intuition can be thougnt of as-a faculty
of the human mind which acts outside the realm of conscious~·

-

-

13.
In situations in which appearances are

deceivin~,

however, intuition can mislead, as in the case of optical
illusions.

A notable instance of such misleading is found

in the belief formerly held that the earth was flat.

~uch

a view of the earth is reasonably consistent with what one
observes and is therefore understa.ndable.

Hence intuition

is reliable only in those instances in which a situation
appears to be the way it actually is.
All knowledge gained intuitively has been obtained in
one of two ways, either by sense intuition or by intellectual intuition.

In this discussion, sense intuition shall

mean a situation such as the following.

With reference

again to the two intersecting straight lines, a person regarding the lines realizes the vertical angles formed are
equal.

The fact that such a relationship can be proved

does not add to sureness.

His realization that the vertical

angles are equal is a fact known by sense intuition, the
sense concerned being that of sight.

It has been found that

many people limit the use of the word intuition to designating the sense type only.
An example of intellectual intuition, as the term is
understood by the ·.vriter, can be found in problem-solving.
At a certain step in the work, the problem-solver, upon
examining the data already assembled, sees two possible
avenues to follow.

Without resorting to trial-and-error,

he decides his plan of action.

~uch

a plan, it seems, can

be said to be known by intellectual intuition, for none

of his senses have played a major part in his reaching a
decision.
It is only natural that the lack of precise definition
has resulted in a confusion
intuitiQB.

regardin~

the use of the term,

Since the word is apparently freauently mis-

used, a discussion of t.he kinds of misuse may, by contrast,
clarify correct usage.

We are alluding to the practice of

using the word intuition as a cover-up for a belief or a
prejudice that cannot actually be proved.

A case in point

concerns an incident factual, by the way, in which a lady
sought to reinforce her belief in the superiority of the
white race over other races by stating that such a view
was intuitively held and obviously valid.

When asked to

supply documentary evidence, all she could do was to fall
back on the usual meaningless cliches plus her personal
interpretR.tion of

intuition~

A similar instance of misuse deals with the employer
who steadfastly refuses to hire what he terms a foreigner.
It may be that to him, a foreigner is anyone whose name is

not Anglo-Saxon.

However that may be, when questioned on

his policies, he asserts vehemently that the wisdom of his
action should be clear by intuition.

Clearly he is imply-

ing that, if anyone questions his viewpoint, the fault
cannot lie in the employer's attitude, but rather in the
challenger's intuitive powers.
Although there assuredly are instances when intuition
may be at fault, there is encouragement in the thought that

15.
intuitive powers can possibly be improved.
accept the possibility of such improvement;

Some do not
such skeptics

may consider their position somewhat weakened by the account
of a class conducted by the c?eneral Electric Company several
years ago. 1

Enrolled in a course called "practical engineer-

ing", the twenty college graduates spent class sessions telling one another their hunches, just as they thought of them.
The act of explaining their ideas to others helped to clarify their own thinking, initiated by the hunches, which, in
turn, were suggested by intuition.

Although class sessions

were characterized by discussion, the time outside class
was characterized by action, and plenty of it.

That is,

outside the classroom, the students performed whatever
operations were indicated in order to carry out their hunches.
The tangible result of the course was a formidable number
of inventions useful to the company.

ivioreover, the ac-

complishments of the class are all the more interesting in
view of the fact that some of those enrolled had never invented anything before.
Reactions to this account are bound to vary greatly.
'l'he sponsors of the class enthusiastically point out the
imposing array of "first inventionsn.

According to the

sponsors, the student's inventions were based on intuitively-

1. c. G. Suits, "Heed That Hunch", American Magazine
(December, 1945), CXL, 142.

16.
obtained hunches.

The production of such inventions proves,

they reason, that the methods of conducting the class had
developed or broadened the students' intuitive powers.
Their opponents might claim, on the other hand, that the
sponsors had succumbed to the "post hoc" fallacy.

It is

just possible that those enrolled in the class would have
carried out their inventions, even if they had not ever been
members of the "practical engineerinp.;" class.

In other words,

perhaps the sponsors had cited a cause-effect relationship
that was not valid.
Those who accept the premise that a

broadenin~

of in-

t ui ti ve powers is possible will naturally wonder just what
factors are conducive to such broadening.

More explicitly,

what traits or habits can be developed in order to achieve
such a goal?

One writer suggests, among other things, train-

ing oneself in alertness, sensitivity, and discipline of
mind.l

The mention of these three undoubtedly worthy aids

makes the improvement of intuitive powers sound far from
an easy task.

Another observer is more specific, for he

says outright that one's interests should be broadened, in
order that intuition can be supplied with plenty of material. 2

~eemingly,

the more varied the experiences, the

greater the possibility of insight into a given situation.
Furthermore, one should learn not to distrust a new
idea simply because it is foreign;

rather, one should welcome

1. John Kord Lagemann, "You're Smarter Than You Think",
Reader's Digest {March, 1952), LX, 40.
2f!. C. G, Suit:::s, "Heed That Hunch" t American .Magazine
( Decemoer,
1945) CXL, 143.
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the new idea.

As

an illustration, a student, after several

unsuccessful bouts with a formidable problem, may be on the
verge of despair.

Perhaps at that very moment a radically

different approach occurs to him.

If he is wise, he will

not summarily dismiss the new thought as ridiculous or illogical.

After all, in order to solve his problem, he may

need an entirely new view;

perhaps he needs an "overview".

On the chance that his new slant will lead to the insight
requisite for success, he should study the ramifications
of the new idea.

At the very least, he needs to consider

as many aspects of the idea as are necessary to indicate
definitely whether or not the idea is practicable.
The last suggestion for the improvement of intuitive
powers to be made is of unquestionable validity, as it has
been practiced so often by so many different people.

When

confronted with a problem which defies solution, the problem-solver should write down all the details as far as he
can go.

Then he should lay the problem aside for a while.

During the "cooling'' period, while the problem-solver is
engaged in some radically different activity, he may get
complete, full insight into the problem.
In this chapter, we have not only given arguments
against defining the term intuition, but we have alee described several characteristics of intuition.

Although

the term is not precisely defined, this paper will be consistent in the way in which the word is used.

Throughout,

intuition shall be used in relation to situations in which
facts are directly known, without recourse to
reasoning.

lo~ical

Chapter III
Intuition and Problem-solving
To the mathematician, the facet of intuition that is
probably most conspicuous is the role played in nroblemsolving.

An integral part of the mathematician's activ-

ities, the quest for solutions to problems appears to he
a dominant feature of other disciplines as well.

Thus the

physicist, the chemist, the zoologist, and the geographer
owe at least some of the developments in their fields to
the existence of problems, or rather, to the fact that certain problems have been tackled and resolved.

Ferhaps it

is not too sweeping a statement to assert that every type
of progress experienced by the human race has resulted from
someone's awareness of a problem.
Since problems arise continually, not only in fields
of study but in every-day situations as ·well, it behooves
us to take at least a passin,r: glance at a few considered
opinions on problem-solving;

we can hope therefrom to be

able to draw one or two reliable conclusions.

Before under-

taking a study of the function of intuition in

solvin~

prob-

lems, however, one should understand the special, directed
type of thinkins necessary for getting solutions.

Such

understanding, in turn, implies an acquaintance with the
mechanism of the thinking process plus an over-all view of
the ways of thinking commonly employed.
Accordingly, the present discussion will first deal
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with the ways of thinking as categorized by three observers.
In the first place, Cassius J. Keyser considers all varieties of thinking as falling into three main groups, the
organic, the empirical, and the postulational.l

The

simplest type, the organic, is nothing more than the response of a living or:.:ranism to a stimulus.

To illustrate,

a one-celled ani:1al, the amoeba, as soon as it comes into
contact with an object, attempts to encl:")se the object,
thus forming a food vacuole.

Instantly, once contact has

taken place, the amoeba's cytoplasm streams in such a way
as to surround the object encountered.

Once the fusion

of the streams of cytoplasm occurs, the object, contained
in a food vacuole, has become a part of the animal's structure.
Higher in the scale of thinking is the empirical tyne,
which is experimental in nature.

A certain degree of logic

is involved, although not to the extent characteristic of
the most complex type of thinking.

An example of the em-

pirical variety is the discovery of the formula for chemical conversion, dx/dt:: - kx, in which x represents the
amount of unconverted substance at any particular time,t.
Careful experimentation has revealed that the rc:1te at which
a substance is converted into another is directly proportional to the amount of unconverted substance.

The right member

of the formula is negative, because, as the time increases,
1. Cassius J. Keyser, 'l'hinking About Thinking (New
York, E. P. Dutton and Company, 192 ), 7 ff.
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the amount of unconverted substance decreases.

As a gen-

eralization based entirely upon past experimentation, the
formula gives a way of predicting the future behavior of
substances, as reg2rds rate of entering into combination
with others.
Into the third category is placed the most
involved kind of thinking, the postulational.

com~1lex,

Such think-

ing, which is described by Keyser as deductive, is a method
of reasoning that is applicable to all fields, not just to
mathematics.

However, since geometry lends itself so

beautifully to any discussion concerning deductive reasoning, an illustration will be taken from that field.
high school sophomore, when

settin~

The

out to prove the pro-

position that two points equally distant from the extremities
of a line determine the perpendicular bisector of the line,
will probably add four auxiliary lines as his first maneuver.
After proving congruent two of the pairs of

trian~les

so

formed, he ultimately establishes the conclusion of the
theorem.
Of course, the usual form in which the above example
of deductive reasoning would be written would '.)resent a
different order from that employed in more general situations, especially, the non-mathematical.

That is, although

deduction commonly follows the procedure from general stc?.tement to specific statement to conclusion, in the above proof
the thinking would proceed from the specific statement to
the conclusion and then, to the general statement.

Either
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procedure can uroduce gems of precise, clear, deductive
thinking.
Providing an interesting contrast to the groupings
just described is the system in which four degrees of complexity are recognized.l

According to this second arrange-

ment, thinking is classified under the heads of perceiving,
recognizing, comparative judging, and reasoning.

Listed

in order of increased complexity, one notes that only the
very highest type is

di~nified

by the name reasoning.

A third method of dealing with the kine: s of thinking
consists of grouping all thinkinr, under three classes, intuitive, deductive, and inductive.2
distinctive for two reasons.

Such a .fSrOUping is

For one thing, intuition is

given a place among other kinds of thinking.

Still more

intriguing, though, is the fact that there is no attempt
to label one type as simple, another, as complex.

The

source consulted says sim':ly that there are three kinds of
thinking and proceeds to name,them.
Even a cursory glance at the three foregoing methods
of classification sugrrests that the three men who composed
the lists could not have been defining the term thinking
in the same way.

What is more significant in relation to

1. R. H. Wheeler, The Science of Psychology, as
quoted in William Betz' The Teachin~ .2f Intuitive Geometry,
Eighth Yearbook, Nationa"I'""i:'ouncil o Teachers of Mathematics (New York, Bureau of Publications, Teachers Colle.r:e,
Columbia University, 1933), 146.
~

2. Lee Emerson Boyer, Mathematics a Historical Develop(New York, Henry Holt and Company, "1945), 303 ff.
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the title of this chapter, however, is the inclusion in
each list of at least one kind of thinking utilized in problem-solving.
In the course of classifying the ways of thinking,
one inevitably speculates about the actual mechanism of
thinking itself.

Moreover, the mathematician is especially

curious about the manner in which direction is given to
his thinking.

He realizes that at worst, his thinking is

no more than a jumble of disconnected links, whereas, at
best, it presents a chain of ideas that are neatly hooked
together.

He wants to analyze the situations in which his

thinking has been orderly and systematized;

he hopes there-

by to be able to apply the all-important direction to the
disconnected links, wherever and whenever he meets them.
When reviewing several cases in which his thinking
has been truly fruitful, the mathematician discovers that
consistently he has emphasized the structural aspects.I
That is, in stressing the nwholeness 11 of the situation, he
has envisaged the given facts and sought-for solution as
comprising

~

pattern.

Success resulted from ferreting

out the inter-relationships among the given facts and the
ideas inferred from the given facts.

However, this stete-

ment does not give the whole truth, for, just as important,
if not more so, is the discovery of the relation each single

1. Max Wertheimer, Productive Thinking (New York,
Harper and Brothers, 1945), !9o.
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fact

be~rs

to the whole pattern.

Emphasizing the whole pattern or structure has at least
two advantages over traditional logic as an explanation of
the way thinkinc~ occurs.l
ing takes place in living
cerning the process of
element of change.

In the first place, since thinkor~anisms,

thinkin~

any explanation con-

must take into account the

Traditional logic, however, is static;

it does not allow for the changes which take place in any
problem-situation during the course of a given discussion.
Such changes do indeed occur, for, as each additional relationship is understood, the whole picture is seen in a
new light.

~·urthermore,

the emphasis on logic tacitly im-

plies that an idea is simply the sum of its narts, that is,
the steps leading up to the idea.

In both respects, aware-

ness of structure appears to be the more nearly accurate
explanation of the mechanism of thinking, since such an
explanation recognizes inevitable change and also includes
the relationships of individual ideas to the whole pattern.
Thus, the process of thinking appears to be characterized
by a search for relationships and an appreciation of the
structure of a given situation, a structure that necessarily
changes from moment to moment.
At this point, the mathematician may ponder on the
causes of the changes in structure experienced as he proceeds from step to step in working out a solution to a problem.

Why, at a particular point, is a particular relation-

1. Max Wertheimer, Productive Thinking (New York,
Harper and Brothers, 1945), 192.
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ship suggested?
direction?

What initiates his moving in a n;:-rticular

In brief, what guides his thinking?

Some may

answer that his mind is working in accordance with the prescribed rules of logic.

Of course, he likes to picture

himself as proceeding logically, but the question of cause
still bothers him.

One observer goes so far as to claim

that there is almost never a completely logical discovery. 1
Intuition is involved, nearly always;

at least, intuition

explains the guidance which directs the first step taken
in thinking through a loi:;ical proof.

Others would soften

this statement considerably by asserting merely that intuition may indicate what step to take.
Inasmuch as an analytic proof to a theorem often precedes a synthetic proof, it would seem that intuition would
more likely be instrumental in determining the order of the
steps of the analytic proof.

Thus, those who credit intu-

ition with playing a role in the writinr; of proofs 1·muld
probably ascribe the determination of the steps of the following proof to intuition.

Lest anyone be misled, let us

make clear the fact that when -,,,re refer to the determination
of steps, we mean the order, not the validity of the steps.
The validity, of course, is ascertained by logic.
In proving a theorem analytically, the general pattern
is to proceed backwards, from the conclusion to the hynothesis.

Hence, in attacking analytically the proDosition that

1. Jacques Hadamard, The Psychology: of Invention in
the Mathematical Field. (Princeton, 1\Tew Jersey, ?rinceton
University Press, 1945), 112.
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lines drawn from any point on the perpendicular bisector
of a line to the extremities of the line are equal, the
student will start with the conclusion.

~efore

he can

go through any steps, however, he needs to express the hy~othesis

in terms of an illustration, which he either pic-

tures in his mind or actually draws on paper.

A possible

procedure follows:
Hypothesis:

RY is the perpendicular bisector of AB and

meets AB at Y;

X is any point on RY, distinct from R and

Y.
To prove:

AX

=BX.

Since corresponding parts of cow':ruent triangles are equal,
AX=. BX if
AAXY :!!! A BXY if

s.

A. S. obtains if
AY =YB if

Y is the midpoint of AB if

Y fulfills the definition of midnoint if
XY is the perpendicular bisector of AB and meets
AB at Y.

{Hypothesis)

XY .= XY.

Since all right angles are equal," XYA = L.XYB if
LXYA is a right angle; LXYB is a right angle if

XY J. AB at Y if
XY is the perpendicular bisector of AB and meets
AB at Y.

{Hypothesis)

With reference to the analytic proof outlined above,
some mathematicians would doubtless ascribe to intuition
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the direction assumed by all the steps.

'l'hese people credit

to intuition not only the first step, but subsecment steps
as well.

Their argument is that the initial imnulse to

prove a pair of triangles congruent is urr.;ed by the illustration, which reveals AX and BX to be corresponding parts of
what appear to be congruent triangles.

Any relationship

that is suggested by a concrete figure is an appeal to intuition, they contend.

Furthermore, they insist that the

steps following the first are likewise suggested by intuition, for example, the step at which Y is proved to be the
midpoint of AB or the one at which LXYA is shown to be a
right angle.
A more conservative group, upon

viewin~

the proof,

would perhaps concede that only the initial direction is
known intuitively.

Thus this group feels that intuition

is called into

only at the very

p~ay

beginnin~,

when a con-

sideration of the figure suggests the possibility of congruent triangles.

Still others would point to the pos-

sibility of a combination of experience, analysis of ultimate relationship sought, and trial-and-error providing the
guidance;

these observers might eliminate intuition from

the picture entirely.

A fourth group is composed of those

who, because of the sketchiness of the evidence offered
by the other three groups, must remain undecided.

They

strongly suspect that intuition has played a part in the
proof, so to speak, but cannot overlook the chance of the
student's having derived direction from other sources, such
as trial-and-error.
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Regardless of how the order of the steps in the above
proof is explained, one must bear in mind that there have
been experiences in the lives of some famous mathematicians
that assuredly strengthen the case for intuition.

One in-

triguing situation concerns a Frenchman of the seventeenth
century, Pierre de Fermat.

l

It appears that at the time

of Fermat's death, someone, while going through the mathematician's papers, found a mystifying comment scribbled in
a narrow marein.

In that margin Fermat had indicated that

he had proved the impossibility of the relation, xll"I + ym .:: z~
when x, y, and z are integers other than zero and m is an
integer larger than 2.

However, he had lamented his not

having enough space in the margin to write his proof.

The

mystery lies in the fact that in the three hundred years
since, the proof has not been discovered by anyone, despite
great efforts.

The most that has been accomplished in these

three centuries of work is some partial proofs.

That is,

proofs for some classes of values of the exponent, m, have
been discovered.

What is inexplicable is the reliance of

at least one partial proof on algebraic theories that were
unknown at the time of Fermat and which were not even implied remotely in his

v..iri tings.

Equally puzzling is an account concerning a German
geometer of a century ago, .bernhard Riemann.2

In his work

1. Jacques Hadamard, ~ Psychology .2f. Invention .!.!:!
the Mathematical Field (Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton
University !·ress, 1945), 116 ff.
2.

Ibid., 117 ff.

2$.

with prime numbers Riemann emphasized a function of a variable which could assume both real and imaginary values.
At his death, there was found among his papers a note which
stated that certain properties of the function had been
deduc,::::ed from an expression of the function which he had
never simplified enough to publish.

As of now, no one has

the slightest notion of the nature of the expression.
In both cases, there appears to be some justification
for the view that these men had intuitive

knowled~e

which

they either did not, or could not organize to the extent
of communicating with others.

Thus Fermat seems to have

"sensed" a proof that, to all appearances, hinged upon relations not yet discovered.

Similarly, Riemann "knew'' an

expression that has eluded other great thinkers down to
the present.

Since apparently neither mathematician could

have gone through any variety of logical reasoning to reach
his particular observation, each must have gained his knowledge directly, or intuitively.
Furthermore, intuition can explain the sudden insight
a problem-solver may experience.

In the course of solving

any problem, there comes the moment when the pattern is
seen with clarity;

this is the moment of insight.

Several

examples of such insight are cited in the next chapter.
When the problem-solver is unsuccessful, that is, unable to obtain the necessary insight, he might try writing
down all the steps as far as he can go.
might ask himself
feels certain.

if

At each step he

he is certain of the step and why he

If he comes to a step which makes him feel
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doubtful, he might try to figure out what it is about the
step that has shaken his confidence.

Regardless of how

much analyzing he does, however, he should get away from
his problem for a while.

Leaving the problem is advan-

tageous for two reasons.

In the first place, there is the

chance that, after the rest, the student may approach his
problem from an entirely new slant.

For another reason,

while he is engaged in something quite different from problem-solving, he just might have a flash of "intuitive insight" into his problem.

If so, he will instantly see

the whole pattern, and thus the solution.

Some of the ways

of perceivinr, the whole pattern will be viewed in the next
chapter.

Chapter IV
Intuition and Insight
As the moment of achievement in problem-solving comes
the instant that insight occurs, it would be well to examine not only the sources of insii;;ht, but also the meaning of the term.

Inasmuch as some people may confuse the

terms insight and intuition and may even consider them
synonymous, a discussion of the relationship between the
two appears warranted.
Insight means discernment, cognition, awareness of the
pattern connecting ideas previously thought to be unrelated.

This awareness or discernment may result from a

careful analysis of the factors involved.

Analysis is not

always a prerequisite, however, for insight may, and often
does, stem from intuition.

The relationship between insight

and intuition therefore, can be seen in
ition and analysis as two sources of

thinkin~

of intu-

insi~ht.

In hopes of gaining insight by analysis, the problemsolver should continually strive to see the problem as a
whole.l

He should keep viewing the problem from nabove"

in order to see it as a unit.
A mathematical illustration of insight stemming from

analysis is dra'Wil from the field of differential equations.

A student is asked to solve the differential equation,
p4

+. xp - 3Y = o, in which y is the dependent variable,

1. Howard F. Fehr, "The Role of Insight in the Learning
of Mathematics", The Mathematics Teacher (October, 1954),
XLVII, 388.
---

JO.
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x is the independent variable, and p renresents the rate of
change of y with respect to x.

First of all, the student

must be clear as to the nature of

h~s

find the solution to a differential

goal.

Required to
he must know

eq~ation,

what the word solution means when used in that particular
way.

At the outset then, before embarking on any steps,

he visualizes his goal as a relationship involving at least

one of the variables, which together vnth its derivatives,
satisfies the given equation.

In order that the general

solution in parametric form may be found, each variable
must be expressed in terms of p.
p, it is necessary to eliminate x.

To express y in terms of
The variable x can be

eliminated by getting x alone in the left member and then
differentiating with respect to y.

(Of course, to elimi-

nate y in a comparable manner would be just as logical a
beginning.)
( 1)

Accordingly, since p'f + xp - 3y = 0

( 2)

x :.:!l.. -

(J)t

r

=t-

(~

p3
i-

)i}

3P2

The act of simplifying, collecting like

te~ms,

and multi-

plying throughout by l/2p dy reveals a linear equation of the
first order.
( 4)

3

dy-"'2: y

d =L
;.r.

2.

3

p

dp

Equation (4) is advantageous, for such an equation can be
changed easily into an exact equation by applying an inte-.l.

grating factor, which,in this case, is p ~.

Thus,
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s

-3_

.:::.£

( 5}

pa: dy - ":L yp. dp=.

( 6)

Integrating, yp

3

_S_

-r

p-r dp

=!.~.LG
2- ::

s

p .a.. +s

The constant of integration is written as c/5 because the
presence of the 3/5 demands a multiplication by 5 in order
that the equation may be cleared of fractions.

Writing

the arbitrary constant term originally as c/5 will yield
c for the constant after the multiplication by 5 has been
carried out.

Specifically, the next step is to multiply

throughout by 5p-i-, yielding
( 7)

5y =- 3P 4I + cp -i;

In order to express x in terms of the parameter p, the value for y obtainable from equation (7) is substituted for
yin equation (2).

_,

Thus,
..L p"'+ 7
C!.
{sp-t ) - p

(8)

x~

(9)

Simplifying, x=-i:-p3+3:

( 10)

Jp

3

p±
3

Clearing of fractions, 5x .::i 4P +

3cp~

'l'he general solution consists of equations ( 7) and ( 10).
In attacking the above problem, the problem-solver's
realization of the nature of the goal determined his first
significant move, differentiating with respect to y.

Next,

the correct classificntion of equation (4) was imperative
that direction for the next step be gained.

The third im-

portant point consisted of the substitution performed in
order to acquire equation (8).
At all three stages,

insi~ht

was gained because of

an ordering and classifying of the elements.

At the first

and third stages, direction was obtained by analyzing the
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type of relationship sought, an expression for each variable in terms of p and one arbitrary constant.

At the

second stage, an analysis of the make-up of equation (4)
led to the awareness of linearity and hence to the solution of that particular equation.
In sharp contrast to the manner in which insip,ht was
gained in the oreceding illustration is an interesting
I

case concerning the German chemist, Friedrich A. Kekule.

1

As professor of organic chemistry at Ghent University in
Belgium, Kekul~ had, for some time, been attempting to
fathom the molecular arrangement of benzene, which arrangement appeared to elude him.

One night in 1$65, he had

a dream so vivid that as soon as he awoke, he dashed to
his desk for paper and pencil.
ture so clear in his mind.

Excitedly he drew the pic-

The pattern that had occurred

to him while asleep was the arrangement of atoms in a
molecule of benzene.

The next morning he enthusiastically

show·ed the drawing to his

collea~ues,

who, understandably

enough, were not nearly so convinced of the accuracy of
the diagram as was Kekul6.

Through the months, however,

as experin:ents dealing with the behavior of benzene tended
I
to support Kekule's
arrangement, the co-workers became

proponents of his views.
About eighty years after the sensational dream and

1. Lawrence Galton, "The Professor Had a Dream",
Nation's Business (June, 1948), XXXVI, 67.
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about fifty years after the chemist's death, absolute
verification was

in the laboratories of

ac~omplished

Eastman Kodak Company.

There, molecules of benzene were

photographed, the photographs bearing out, in the most
minute detail, the

arran~ement

known intuitively to

Kekul~ years beforet

Not so dramatic, but equally as thrilling is the experience of a student a year a.P.:o.
which had teased him for two days.

Here is the problem
Let P and Q be con-

tinuous functions of x and y and have continuous derivatives,
with ap/ay == e>Q/-a x, except at the points (4,0), (O,O), and
{-4,0).
C~

Let

c, denote the circle:

denote the circle:

the circle:

{P

dx

+

Q

x:1. + y ..

dy

(

=.

;L

{x - 2) "" + y -1.
~

x + 2) + y : 9;

= 9;

let

let C3 denote

Given that[. P dx + Q dy == 11,
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= 9,f P dx +
3

where C'f is the circle:

Q dy =:. 13, findfP dx + Q dy,
.a.
c'/
x + y =- 1. Upon making a draw2..

ing, the student reelized that C3 contained the three circles enclosing the points of discontinuity.

He knew from

a previously solved problem, that under the conditions in
the present problem, the line integral around

c3 was equal

to the sum of the line integrals around the circles surrounding the points of discontinuity, provided, that each
circle about such a point enclosed none of the other troublesome points.
matter.
with

C~

circles.

Herein lay the crux of the whole puzzling

Unfortunately, the circles C1 and

C~

overlapped,

being internally tangent to each of the other two
Perhaps we should not use the word unfortunately
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since, if the three circles had not overlapped, the exercise would have been trivial, and hence would not have posed
a problem at all.
To return to the student, several times he examined
the drawing, hoping to see some legal way of nmoving" the
circles so as to have no overlapping.

He referred again

and again to the hypotheses, as a check on the accuracy
of his diagram.

However, his circles bore the very relation-

ships to each other that had been stipula.ted b'! the hypotheses.

At last, admitting that his tactics were gettinp

him nowhere, he laid the problem aside and went about other
duties that were cryinr, for his attention.

A few hours

later, while occupied with a mundane task, he had a flash
of intuitive insight into the problem.

All at once, while

he was thinking about something utterly different, the
"flash" caine;

right away, without p;oing through any variety

of "if-then" reasoning, he knew how to combat the overlapping circles.
Q

dy) -

£ (P
~

In this moment of insight, he saw that[{-(P dx+
dx +

Q

dy)] would indeed give a line integral

about a circle surrounding the point (-4,0), a circle that
would not overlap the others.

Simultaneously he saw that he

could deal in a similar fashion with the point (4,0).

All

of this he grasped in an instant, in much less time than
is being required to record his experience.
The insieht realized above was of the "intuitive flash"
type and was not the outcome of careful analysis and reasoning, such as characterized the solution of the differential
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Like Kekul~, the student obtained insi~ht into

equation.

his Droblem when he '>\las detached from the problem, both
physically and mentally.
In all three problems described, the differential
equation, the molecular arrangement of benzene, and the
r'roblem dealinp; with line integrals, insight was the immediate fore-runner of solution.
penetrating

insi~ht

In the last tvw instances,

came all at once, on an occasion hard-

ly thought conducive to problem-solving.

Insivht into

solving the differential equation, however, followed careful analysis and conscious application of reasoning to the
problem.

No claim is being made that intuition played no

part at all in solving the first problem;

rather, the dis-

tinction between the two methods of solution lies in the
fact that on the one hand, insight was gained primarily
by deliberate analysis, whereas on the other hand, insight
occurred as an unexpected flash of understanding.
Of course, flashes of insight are not confined to mathematics and laboratory exneriences.

Such insight fre('uently

guides actions in every-day situations as well.

For in-

stance, upon being introduced to a stranger, a person may
"know" instantly that he has just found a friend.

Although

he may not with accuracy be able to attribute his knowledge
to sudden insight into the other's character, he nevertheless
senses something in the other that is in harmony with his
own interests.
Then too, on the very first day of school, a teacher
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may need to select a pupil to run an errand.

Presupposing

a lack of acquaintance with her students, the teacher must
rely on the kind of judgment thct is not based on reasoning.

She looks the class over;

she thinks is dependable.

quickly she chooses a child

Sometimes she errs in making

such "spot" estimates, but very often subsequent dealings
with her pupils bear out her initial impressions.
Also, a judge will sometimes suspend sentence for no
other reason than a hunch about the character of the accused;

for no identifiable reason, he is confident that

the other will not abuse the chance to make a new start.
Speaking of cases involving the law, several crimes
have been solved because of some officer's intuitive insight.

That is, the officer knows the instant he sees a

particular suspect that he has found the guilty one.

Be-

cause of his assurance of the suspect's guilt, he realizes
that obtaining a confession is simply a matter of time.

Of

course, we are not referring to the type of situation in
which there are tell..;.tale nervous mannerisms or strong circumstantial evidence.

We mean the kind of case in which

guilt is immediately known, even when there is not enough
evidence to warrant strong suspicion.
On less serious occasions, a person sometimes will have
real insight into the reliability or lack of reliability of
another, but for some inexplicable reason, does not abide
by his hunch.

For example, a teacher is approached by a

pupil in regard to a loan.

Perhaps there is something not
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quite convincing in the story the pupil pours out;

per-

haps there is something in the pupil's manner that does
not ring true.

Very possibly the teacher, if he will be

frank with himself, is aware from the beginning of the intervie·w of the lack of wisdom of lending the nupil money.
Foolishly, the teacher reaches for his check-book and writes
the pupil a check for the amount deemed necessary.
the terms of re-payment are discussed;
teacher is
left.

regrettin~

True,

nevertheless, the

his action as soon as the pupil has

Months later, when he is forced to admit that he

will never be able to exact re-payment, he castigates himself for having closed his eyes to his first insight, unhappily correct.
Hence,

insi~ht

stemming from intuition can be experi-

enced in widely differing situations, from the

arran~ement

of a molecule of benzene, to a problem in advanced calculus, to an acknowledgment of an introduction, to a court
of law.
1,;oncerned primarily vdth the crucial moment in riroblem-solving, the point at which insight occurs, this chapter
has presented insight as a recognition of the pattern connecting the elements of a problem-situation.

Furthermore,

in order to see what relation insight bears to intuition,
two sources of insight were examined and illustrated in some
detail.

Thus, the solution of the differential equation

featured analysis as a preliminary to insight, whereas, in
the solutions to the problems dealing with the molecular
arrangement of benzene and the line integrals, as well as
in the less detailed examples, intuition played a dominant
role.

Chapter V
Intuition and lieometry
Now that a study of the relationship between intuition
and insight has been presented, the next relationship to
be regarded is that of intuition to the course so long revered in high school curricula, geometry.

The subject of

intuitive geometry is vigorously debated, with one faction
asserting that intuition is indispensable to the study of
geometry and another faction declaring with equal sincerity
that intuition has no bearing whatever on the topic of
geometry.

'l'hus, with whichever ±. . action the student aligns

himself, he must be prepared to defend his position against
formidable, thought-provoking attacks

fro~

the other group.

Since the subject of intuitive r;eometry is far from shallow,
it cannot be dispensed with in a summary fashion.

The most

we can hope to do is to present the telling arguments both
for and against the intuitive approach to the study of geometry.

We believe there is more evidence in favor of the

one side, rather than, the other.

However, we cannot for-

get that there are dissenters whose opinions cannot be
slighted, who are equally convinced of the reasonableness
of their stand.
Before proceeding further, the meaning of the phrase
intuitive geometry should be clarified.

Intuitive geometry,

often called informal, concrete, heuristic, and experimental,
is that approach to geometry which is characterized by drawing generalizations from common experiences.

In the tradi-

tional, demonstrative type, on the other hand, the subject-

,9.
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matter is organized into a formal body of proofs.

In this

latter variety of geometry, each new fact is believed true
by virtue of its being lop;ically derived from statements
previously accepted.

In such geometry, the truth of a par-

ticular statement may or may not be immediately apparent.
An ardent defender of traditional methods and vir:orous opponent to the use of intuition as a basis for
studying any phase of geometry is an Austrian mathematician,
Hans Hahn.l

Insisting upon a purely logical basis for the

construction of mathematics, he points to the unreliability
of intuition as evidence favoring his assertion.

Thus, in

support of his position, he mentions specifically two notable facts opposed to what would probably be considered
"intuitively obvious".

For one thing, Hahn brings out the

fact that there are curves that possess !!.£ tangent at any
point.

Another idea equally unpalatable is his. claim that

there exist wave curves which cannot be r-·enerated by the
motion of a point.

Hahn says that offhand, anyone, when

referring to experience, would think the opposite of either

of these statements to be the case.

By making use of con-

vincing illustrations, though, he backs up both statements
in a manner that cannot be ignored.

What this mathematician

1. Hans Hahn, "Geometry and Intuition", Scientific
American (April, 1954), CXC, 84 ff.
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has shown, in a dramatic manner, is that intuition cannot
be depended upon to guide accurately.
Hahn's chief argument against the use of intuition in
geometry, however, is the point dealt with at some length
in a previous chapter.

Reference is being made to the fact

that the word intuition is defined differently by different
people.

According to Hahn, the lack of definition implies

the impossibility of ascribing any particular

~eometric

truths

to intuition, which, in turn, implies the utter uselessness
of intuition as a basis for geometry.
At the other extreme, another mathematician, William
Betz, goes so far as to assert that intuition plays an indispensable part in demonstrative geometry.I
~ervor

With great

he outlines several significant supporting facts,

of which a few will be presented here.

In the first place,

he maintains that intuition c_annot be overlooked, for sooner
or later, every relation must be explained by meaningful
terms.

Apparently, Betz thinks that, for a term to be mean-

ingf'ul, it must be related to experience, to ordinary observation.
Also, any use of geometric figures is an appeal to
intuition.

Not only are physical properties of figures

1. William Betz, The Teaching of Intuitive Geometry,
Eighth Yearbook of the National Councfl of Teachers of
Mathematics (New York, Bureau of Publications, Teachers
College, Columbia University, 1933), 55 ff.
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known by intuition, but positional facts as well.

For in-

stance, intersecting lines, intersecting circles, concentric
circles, and adjacent angles are so understood.
Most significant, though, is the function of intuition
in the so-called "logical" aspects of geometry.

As indicated

earlier, the validity of a particular step in a proof is
designated by logic, but which step to take next is often
suggested by intuition.

Thus, even in the construction of

a synthetic proof, some credit should go to intuition, for,
previous to being built up synthetically, the proof probably
was thought through analytically.

During the analytic stap:es,

intuition may have been instrumental in determining the order
of the steps.
Further evidence favoring intuition in geometry is found
in history.

Only a novice naively credits all the relation-

ships in Euclidean eeometry to Euclid himself.

Euclid's

genius lay not in discovery, but rather in the ability to
organize effectively relationships already known by intuition.

That these relationships grasped intuitively by the

people of pre-Euclidean times were not proved, did not
lessen the assurance with which they were applied in practical situations.

Hence, before the rise of demonstrative

geometry, mathematical relationships,

lackin~

both nroof

and organization, were nevertheless known to be true; such
knowledge is being ascribed to intuition.
Supported by staggering evidence gathered from the
necessity for meaningful terms, from the universal use of
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geometric fi.'';Ures, from the manner in which nosi tional facts
are ascertained, from the indispensable role played in the
development of an analytic proof, and from history, the case
for intuition as a basis for geometry is a stron7 one.

The

question now arises as to the methods appropriate for presenting a course in intuitive geometry.
Before embarking on any kind of answer to that question,
perhaps we had better make sure that no one has been misled
in the orevious discussion.

In the references to two tyoes

of r-i:eometry, intuitive and demonstrative, we did not intend
to give the impression that we are thinkinp: of these two
approaches as poles apart.

That is, we have not meant to

imply that a course in demonstrative geometry can make no
use of intuition, or vice versa.

'!'he distinction is be-

tween emphases rather than between methods thought mutually
exclusive.

That the two emphases may work hand-in-hand will

now be demonstrated.
First of all, in teaching beginners in demonstrative
geometry, the teacher should make postulates of all facts
that can be known intuitively.I

A list of such facts

fol1ows:
1.

Vertical angles are equal

2.

If two straight lines are cut by a transversal so

1. Gertrude E. Allen, !!:!.. Experiment in Redistribution
of Material for Hii::rh School Geometr*, FiftnYearbook of the
National Council~Teachers of Mat ematics (New York, Bureau
of. Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1930)

79ff.
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that the corresponding angles are equal, the lines are
parallel, and the converse.

3.

If two straight lines are cut by a transversal

so that the alternate interior angles are equal, the lines
are parallel, and the converse.

4.

The area of a rectangle is equal to the product

of the length and the width.

5.

A central angle has the same number of degrees

as its intercepted arc.

6.

Equal central angles have equal arcs, and the

converse.

7.

If, while approaching their respective limits,

two variables are always equal, then their limits are equal.

8.

The base angles of an isosceles triangle are equal,

and other properties of figures which are evident from symmetry should be postulated.

9.

Two triangles that have three pairs of corres-

ponding sides equal are

con~ruent,

and other cases in

which congruence can be determined by super,osition should

be postulated.
Since a student can know any of the above facts intuitively, he need not go through proofs;

after all, once

he sees the relationships indicated above, he is as sure
as he will ever be of their acceptability.

Any proof he

might think through would not add a whit to his sureness.
Just as important as postulating statements intuitively acceptable is the necessity for giving emphasis to ge-
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ometry in the elementary grades.

It is a lamentable fact

that some schools, possibly most, stress geometry too little
in the upper grades.
suffered from being

Geometry, like foreign language, has
rele~ated

exclusively to high school

level, at least as regards most aspects of the subject.
Such short-sightedness in curriculum-planning has resulted
in the student's confusion, and hence, fear.

All at once,

when enrolled in tenth-grade geometry, the student finds
himself subjected to a method of presentation different from
that employed in any of his other subjects.

Then too, the

subject-matter of geometry clings together in a fasion new
to him and utterly unlike anything previously encountered.
Furthermore, he must learn a whole new vocabulary.

Reflect

for a little on the barrier to communication that is raised
by such terms as parallel, transversal, theorem, postulate,
axiom, converse, contrapositive, and perpendicular.

Even

the spelling of some of the tenns presents hazards, as
witness the word rarallel.

It would be interesting to

compile a list of the variety of attempts at spelling this
one word that may appear in only one set of final examinationst
Thus, to the student who has had no preparation for
the study of geometry, the subject must seem to be a hodgepodge of facts, figures, and unfamiliar terms which must
somehow be lined up into precise, formal proofs.
To help their pupils avoid the confusion resulting
from the attempt to assimilate too many new ideas too
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quickly, teachers can present some of the terms and relationships earlier in the pupil's school-life.

Small beginnings

can even be made in the fourth and fifth grades.

An in-

teresting sidelight is the fact that there actually exist
textbooks in geometry that were written for the use of
1
children as young as five years of age.
It seems that, at the very least, the children of the
intermediate grades could be tau:::;ht to identify the more
common geometric figures, such as the square, the circle,
and the triangle.

As a special plea, let the junior high

school pupil understand the true relationship between rectangles and squares, so that he will !!.,2! think of those
two figures as members of two distinct classes.

In our

own experience, we do not recall a single case of a Puoil
embarking upon tenth-grade geometry with the realization
that a square is

~

special type of rectangle.

While introducing the young pupil to geometric figures,
let us not limit ourselves to the plane figures.
all, the child lives in a three-dimensional world.

After
He is

familiar with boxes, tin cans, lamp shades, and ice cream
cones, to name just a few of the solids that are an integral
part of his life.

Therefore, it is logical that he be

1. William Betz, The Teaching of Intuitive Geometry,
Eighth Yearbook of the National Council of Teachers of
Mathematics (New York, Bureau of Publications, Teachers
College, Columbia University, 1933), 63.
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taught to differentiate among, for example, rectangular
solids, cylinders, cones, and frustums of cones.

With

skillful teaching, he can be led to observe the identifying properties, both those that separate the solids and
those that group various ones together.
In addition to observing the properties, the student
should be required to articulate his observations, as such
a requirement will train him in precise statement and clear
expression.

Hence, hand-in-hand with observing relation-

ships among concrete figures, the student should be obliged to express his observations verbally, not only in
order to contribute to the classwork, but especially to
clarify his own thinking.

Often tenth-grade students cap-

able of making keen observations have been hampered by the
inability to express themselves.

Thus, training a pupil

to articulate his thoughts will equip him with just as valuable an asset as will teaching him to observe relationships.

Both these assets will serve him in good stead when

he is launched upon demonstrative

~eometry.

Furthermore, the junior high school student is not
too young, in our opinion, to comprehend the relativity
of truth.

He can surely be led to see that something is

true only to the extent that something else is true, which,
in turn, is true only to the extent that a third statement
is acceptable.

~uch

an understanding will give him the

enormous advantae:e of realizing that, in any kind of reasoning, a set of basic assumptions is the startinp.; place.

>re
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say advantage, because, aware of the need for assumptions,
he will not be surprised that his course in demonstrative
geometry first lists assumptions, which he will expect 1Q.
~

in support of later statements.
In the junior high grades, the main goal, in

re~ard

to the parts dealing with geometry, should be to acquaint
the pupils experimentally with geometric facts.

Such ex-

perimentation involves intuition, for facts comprehended
immediately through the senses will be accepted, without
the formalization of proof.
Not only the junior high school pupils, but the tenthgrade students as well, can benefit from intuitive experimentation.

It is suggested that, as much as possible,

the students in high school geometry be allowed to use
the intuitive approach, which utilizes constantly the
student's experiences and common-sense understandings.

It

is recommended that there be no abrupt jump, but rather,
a gradual transition, from the intuitive to the demonstrative.

If well-organized and well-tauP.ht, the course

in geometry can successfully combine knowledge gained without recourse to formal reasoning with knowledge derived
from ideas previously accepted.
Also, by making frequent use of the analytic method
of proof and of generalizations that can be drawn from
inspection of concrete members of a class of figures, the
teacher will call intuition into play.

Best of all, in

using the analytic method of proof, the class will be able
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to see how the synthetic proof is built up.
Looking back, this chapter first presented the "pros"
and "cons" of intuitive geometry.

In view of the heavy

evidence favoring such course-work, it appeared worthwhile
to note some of the theorems that could very well be postulated and why they could be postulated.

The latter part

of the chapter dealt with suggestions for including intuitive geometry in junior high school arithmetic and the
advantages gained thereby.

Also, reference was made to the

possible combining of the intuitive and demonstrative phases
of a tenth-grade course in geometry.

Chapter VI
Intuition and Mathematical Foundations
In the course of considering intuition as a basis for
•

certain phases of geometry, one may naturally wonder about
the role of intuition in the very foundations of mathematics.

Although no clear-cut statement is possible, the

positions of two of the leading schools of thought will
be portrayed in hopes of shedding some much-needed light.
We are referring, of course, to the intuitionist and formalist schools of mathematical foundations.

Following a

cursory examination of the views of the schools deemed by
the writer to be the most significant, implications of opposine attitudes towards the Law of the Excluded Middle
will be explored.
Probably the predominant characteristic of the formalist school, of which David Hilbert was the

leadin~

ex-

ponent, is the thought that the foundations of mathematics
do not lie in logic, but rather, in prelogical symbols that
are the bases for logical thinking and are understood intu-

itively .l

These prelogical symbols, the formalists argue,

should be manipulated mechanically according to arbitrary
rules, so that the whole body of mathematics becomes formalized into a collection of formulae.2

1. E. R. Stabler, Introduction to Mathematical Thought
(Cambridge, Massachusetts, Addison-WeS!ey Publishing Company,
Incorporated, 1953), 250.
2. Louis o. Kattsoff, A Philosophy of Mathematics
{Ames, Iowa, The Iowa State College Press-;-1949), 122.
50.
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Furthermore, the arbitrary rules followed in manipulating
the symbols are restricted only to the condition that they
display consistency.l

Such consistency, the formalists claim,

is sufficient to guarantee existence of any particular number.2

For instance, it might be assumed that there is no

such number as one with a special given property.
however, that reasoning based on a set of

Suppose,

postul~tes

al-

ready accepted leads to a contradiction of the assumption
with regard to the number.

This contradiction is enough,

the formalists argue, to give assurance of the actual
existence of the number.

In other words, the contradiction

of the assumption that there is .!12 such number means that
there is such a number.

More generally, a statement is

considered to be true if it can be shown to lead to no
contradiction.3
On the other side of the fence, the intuitionists assert
that consistency does not imply existence (of a number) but
rather, merely the possibility of existence.4

Thus, if

the assumption of the existence of a particular number be
contradicted, then only the possibility of the existence of
the number will have been demonstrated.

To be certain that

a number really does exist, one must construct the number
explicitly, thereby changing the possibility into an actuality_

1. Louis O. Kattsoff, A Philosophy of Mathematics
(Ames, Iowa, The Iowa State-College Press, 1949), 116.
2.

Ibid., 157.

J.

Ibid., 122.

4.

Ibid., 157.
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In addition, the intuitionists believe that knowledge
of mathematical concepts is gained immediately by intuition,
and not through the offices of symbolism, so revered by the
formalists.
However, it is in the realm of infinite sets where the
views of the two schools differ so widely.

In fact, in

that realm, the schools are diametrically opposed to each
other.

Because they limit their rules only to the con-

dition of consistency, the formalists, in contending that
consistency implies existence, necessarily hold the Law
of the Excluded Middle to be applicable always, even to
situations concerned with an infinite array of propositions.l
In order to apply the Law of the Excluded Middle to an infinite set, they surely are assuminp, that ordinary twovalued logic obtains. 2

After all, if a particular proposi-

tion is believed true, the falsity of the other possibilities
relative to the proposition must have been previously established.

Thus the formalists are assuming that every

member of the infinite set has to be either true or false.
That a member of an infinite array must be either true
or false is the very point 1"lith which the intuitionists
disagree, and the-/ disagree violently.

Inasmuch as not all

members of an infinite set can be examined, one by one,

1. Louis O. Kattsoff, A Philosophy of Mathematics
(Ames, Iowa, The Iowa State College Press-;-1949), 122.
2. According to two-valued logic, something is either
true or false; hence, truth and falsity are the only possibilities.
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the truth or falsity of every member cannot be ascertained.
Therefore, when dealing with infinite sets, the intuitionists maintain that a three-valued logic is reauisite;

that

is, each member must be categorized as pne of these three:
true, false, or "undecidable".
Apparently, the intuitionists have a point, for undeniably, not all the members of an infinite set can be
tested or scrutinized.

Since not every member can be

studied, it is illogical to Assert that every member is
either true or false.

Since the application of the idea

of the "excluded middle" implies just such

testin~,

it does

not appear reasonable to claim that any one point is true
simply because of its being the "middle".

For that matter,

the words excluded middle could bear defining when used in
conjunction with sets not finite.

The word middle seems

to indicate a group made up of a finite number of things.
Hence, the use of the term in connection with an infinite
number of objects is paradoxical.
On the other hand, the formalists' assertion of the
truth of any statement not contradicted by an agreed-upon
set of postulates is entirely acceptable to us.

In any

variety of logical reasoning, a set of 2ssumptions deemed
basic must be subscribed to first.

Once the basic assump-

tions have been outlined, any proposition consistent with

1. Louis o. Kattsoff, A Philosophy of Mathematics
(Ames, Iowa, The Iowa State College Press-;-1949) , 175.
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the "foundation facts" is considered true.

At any rate,

such a proposition is true to the extent that the basic
assumptions are true.

Hecause of their emphasis on con-

sistency, the formalists feel that if the proposition that
no number with a specified property exists can be shown
to be contradicted, (when reference is made to the set of
postulates deemed basic), then they can be assured that
the number does indeed exist.
On the matter of existence of numbers, we cannot go
along

the

with~intuitionists'

insistence on the necessity of

construction of the number.

Perhaps they mean by construe-

.tion that the number must be exhibited or demonstrated in
some fashion.

However, surely application of the Law of

the Excluded Middle to a finite set could prove that a
number with the required property exists, even though the
number is not identified in any way.

Of course, it could

be that the intuitionists are defining existence differently
than their opponents are defining the term.
In behalf of the intuitionists, though, their views
regarding infinite sets are not only interesting, but seem
to make sound sense as well.

Je are alluding especially

to the thought that contradiction of the stEitement relative to non-existence implies only the possibility that
the opposite is true.

We keep thinking of how the absence

of an alibi merely indicates the possibility of the guilt
of a suspect, not the actual

r~uilt.

Maybe the analogy is

not too far-fetched to help bring out our point.
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Throughout the course of these chapters, this paper
has dealt with the role of intuition in various situations.

Thus,

throu~h

description and illustration, in-

tuition has been shown to be intimately concerned not
only with problem-solving, insight, and geometry, but
with the ultimate foundations of mathematics as well.
As with the other three topics, the relationship of inintuition to foundations is a controversial one; at one
pole, the formalists ascribe knowledge of symbols to
intuition, and at the other, the intuitionists, with
equal assurance, credit knowledge of the numbers themselves to intuition.

Epilogue
The mathematician, in accepting the challenge of a
problem, may summon various aids to meet the demands involved.

For one thing, he may seek ideas from people

whose scholarship appears to merit confidence and who hive
satisfied him as to their ability to apply clear, reasonably
objective thinking to questions.
As another aid, the mathematician may take mental excursions into the reasoning of various writers.

Of course,

these excursions entail the heavy responsibility for sorting
out the ideas that appear pertinent and
ideas in his ovm terms.

interpretin~

these

Aware of the risk that is always

involved in attempting to interpret the mind of another,
he can only hope that the exercise of care and discretion
will effect a fair representation.
In the third place, the mathematician may, and often
does examine his own experiences as teacher and student.
That is, he may try to re-trace
particular problems.

t~

thinking done in solving

Such introspection is very difficult,

for what could be harder than to attempt to analyze one's
own thinking?

Since, try as he will, the mathematician

cannot dissociate himself from himself, he regards the task
of scrutinizing his own reasoning as his most difficult
assignment.

Although aware that his view of himself may be

grossly inaccurate, he nevertheless forges ahead in his
efforts to unravel the chain of thoughts that have led him
to a solution.

An individual endowed with intense curiosity,

he would probably try to study his thinking even if there
were no possible "practicalu outcome, such as application
of the method analyzed to future problems.
Thus, when attacking a new topic that is just obscure
enough to provide the necessary challenge, the mathematician
may call upon opinions of his teachers, writings he deems
pertinent, and his own experiences as

~ides.

After classifying and interpreting the ideas assembled,
he may lean back in his chair with a kind of quiet elation
over having found some sort of system in the ideas he has
handled.

Before long, however, he leans forward, reaching

for paper and pencil.

After all, just ahead is a new challenge.
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